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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
ABSTRACT
The goal of this project has been to develop logics for reasoning about scurity at both the qualitative and quantitative level. Two approaches have been considered. The first builds on a logic designed by the PI that has a binary operator ->, where p->q is interested as "the probability of p given q goes to I." The logic has been applied to proving the com:ctness of a variety of security protocols. Doing this required extending the uriginal logic to include additional operators for reasoning about traces, essentially with freatures in the spirit of dynamic logic. A sound proof system for hte extended logic was devleoped. The seond approach involves a logic for reasoning about knowledge, probability and itme. A special case, restrictiog to only probability I statements, gives a qualitative logic of belief. A key innovation in the logic is distiognishing between strings and message terms. This allows an agent receiving a string s that represents a message m encrypted by a key k to he uncertain about what message term the strings represents. It is shown that this approach deals with resource-hounded agents in a natural and powerful way.
SUBJECT TERMS
Cryptography, probability, security, quantitative, qualitative, conditional logic, knowledge, strings, messages. 
Goals and Accomplishments
Two largely disjoint approaches have been used to prove the correctness of security protocols. The first essentially ignores the details of cryptography by assuming perfect cryptography (i.e., nothing encrypted can ever be decrypted without the encryption key) and an adversary that controls the network. By ignoring the cryptography, it is possible to give a more qualitative proof of correctness, using logics designed for reasoning about security protocols. Indeed, this approach has enabled axiomatic proofs of correctness and model checking of proofs. The second approach applies the tools of modern cryptography to proving correctness, using more quantitative arguments. Typically it is shown that, given some security parameter k (where k may be, for example, the length of the key used) an adversary whose running time is polynomial in k has a negligible probability of breaking the security, where "negligible" means "less than any inverse polynomial function of k."
The goal of this project has been to develop logics for reasoning about security at both the qualitative and quantitative level. Two approaches have been considered. The first builds on a logic designed by the PI that has a binary operator →, where φ → ψ is interpreted as "the probability of ψ given ψ goes to 1." Proof of qualitative statements of the form φ → ψ in the logic can automatically be converted to proofs of quantitative statements of the form φ → r ψ, where r is a real number in [0, 1], which is interpreted as "the probability of ψ given φ is at least 1 − r." In joint work with Anupam Datta, John Mitchell, and Arnab Roy, the logic has been applied to proving the correctness of a variety of security protocols. Doing this required extending the original logic to include additional operators for reasoning about traces, essentially with features in the spirit of dynamic logic. A proof system for the extended logic was developed that was shown to be rich enough to prove correctness of a variety of protocols. Interactions between the conditional probability assertions and dynamic logic assertions were studied.
The second approach, joint work with the PI, Ron van der Meyden, and Riccardo Pucella, involves a logic for reasoning about knowledge, probability, and time. A special case, restricting to only probability 1 statements, gives a qualitative logic of belief. By allowing arbitrary probability statements, more quantitative statements can be expressed. A key innovation in the logic is distinguishing strings from messages as a way to capture the fact that agents are resource bounded. For example, suppose that i sends j the message m , where m is m encrypted by a shared key k. Does j know that i has sent m encrypted by k? If j does not have the key k, then, intuitively, the answer is no; agent j has no way of knowing that m is the result encrypting m by k. Of course, if j were not computationally bounded, then j could figure out that m is indeed m encrypted by k. Standard approaches to modeling knowledge treat agents as computationally unbounded; in particular, they are assumed to know all valid formulas. Since the fact that m is the result of encrypting m by k is a valid mathematical statement, all agents will know it.
To get around this problem, two views of messages are considered. The first views a message simply as a string of symbols; the second views the message as a term with structure. When j receives the message m , j knows that he received (the string) m . What j does not know is that he received m encrypted by k; j considers it possible that m is m encrypted by k , or that m is not the encryption of any message. By considering both strings and terms, and mappings between them, an agent can be uncertain about what term a string represents. Thus, for example, an agent i may know that s represents the encryption of some message, even though i does not know which message it is the encryption of. This approach deals with resource-bounded agents in a natural and powerful way. 
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